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EXODUS FROM THE LAND OF CONFUSION: WHY HUGHES V. 
UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE OVERRULING OF THE 
UNWORKABLE MARKS DOCTRINE AND A CHANGE IN COURT 
PRACTICE 
ABSTRACT 
The Marks doctrine was established by the Supreme Court as an earnest 
attempt to divine binding precedent from fractured decisions that failed to gain 
support from a majority of the Justices. While well-intentioned, the doctrine has 
proved to be, at best, difficult, and more often nearly impossible to correctly 
apply with any degree of certainty. Recently, in Hughes v. United States, the 
Court had the opportunity to further flesh out the doctrine and provide 
struggling courts and practitioners guidance when working with the rule’s 
abstruse mandates. Instead, the Court declined this opportunity. This comment 
will discuss the development of the doctrine, the challenges that courts have had 
when working with it, and the doctrine’s ultimate illogicality and unworkability. 
The Court’s failure in Hughes to further develop the doctrine signifies the 
beginning of the end. The Marks doctrine more properly belongs in a museum 
than in contemporary American jurisprudence, and this comment will conclude 
that the doctrine, along with non-majority opinions in general, should be 
rendered obsolete and replaced by one, and only one, majority opinion that 
provides the binding precedent for future courts to follow. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The second half of the twentieth century has seen a marked increase in the 
number of concurring and dissenting opinions issued by the Supreme Court.1 
Because of this myriad of opinions, oftentimes no single opinion manages to 
garner the support of at least five justices.2 The question then arises of how to 
determine binding precedent when a majority of the Court fails to subscribe to a 
single opinion. In an attempt to solve this quandary and provide lower courts 
guidance when weeding through a mess of concurring opinions that reach a 
common result but with oftentimes wildly divergent reasoning, the Court in 
Marks v. United States instructed that in these cases, the holding of the Court is 
the position taken by the justices who concurred in the judgments on the 
“narrowest grounds.”3  
Although the “narrowest grounds” doctrine was intended to dispel much of 
the confusion surrounding non-majority opinions and their precedential value, 
the doctrine has created more problems than it has solved.4 Without directly 
speaking to the doctrine’s continuing validity, the Court has been fickle in 
deciding whether to even apply the doctrine in a case where it might be 
appropriate.5 The Court is fully aware of the headaches that it has caused with 
its Marks opinion. Recently, in Hughes v. United States, the Court was presented 
with an opportunity to apply the Marks doctrine to a prior case with a near-
identical fact pattern.6 The Court instead bypassed the Marks question and 
proceeded to resolve the case by applying the plurality opinion of the prior case.7 
Justice Sotomayor, whose lone concurrence was responsible for the lack of a 
majority opinion in the prior case, acquiesced to the majority in Hughes in order 
 
 1. Linas E. Ledebur, Comment, Plurality Rule: Concurring Opinions and a Divided Supreme 
Court, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 899, 900 (2009). 
 2. Id. at 904. 
 3. 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) 
(plurality opinion)). 
 4. Mark A. Thurmon, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of 
Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L. J. 419, 446 (1992) (explaining that the doctrine 
produces inconsistent results, fails to reliably predict the outcome of future decisions, and often 
leaves lower courts without guidance). 
 5. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309, 1310 n.2 (1994) 
(identifying and treating a “narrowest grounds” concurrence in a prior opinion as controlling); 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (declining to apply Marks because the inquiry has 
“baffled and divided” the lower courts); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745–46 (1994) 
(similarly declining to apply Marks); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) 
(making no mention of Marks, but instead proceeding to overrule a prior case due to the degree of 
confusion resulting from the splintered decision). 
 6. 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2018). 
 7. Id. at 1776. 
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to ensure clarity and stability in the law despite continuing to hold her divergent 
viewpoints on the issue.8 
This comment will argue that Hughes foretells a formal overruling of the 
Marks doctrine by the Supreme Court. It will begin with a discussion of the 
doctrine’s development. It will then explore the various methods and 
interpretations used to apply the doctrine, identify their shortcomings, and 
ultimately conclude that these shortcomings, when assessed in light of Hughes, 
warrant a full overruling of Marks. It will then explore different possibilities for 
ascertaining binding precedent in the doctrine’s absence before finally 
concluding that plurality opinions should be altogether prohibited to streamline 
the Court’s decisions and promote uniformity in the law. Due to the current 
dissension within the Court, this comment will provide an answer to those 
hoping for a return to a time when the Court was more unified in its voice.  
II.  HISTORY OF THE COURT’S APPROACHES TO SEPARATE OPINIONS AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF THE MARKS DOCTRINE 
Although it is the province and duty of the Supreme Court to say what the 
law is,9 the Constitution provides very little guidance as to how the Court should 
perform its interpretive function.10 Consequently, at the Court’s inception, it 
followed the English common law practice of issuing seriatim opinions.11 
Because no decision produced a single opinion of the Court, ambiguities in the 
law abounded, which limited the early Court’s effectiveness and prevented the 
Court from establishing itself as the head of a strong independent branch of 
government.12 
That all changed in 1801 when John Marshall took his seat as Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court. Under his leadership, the Court abandoned the seriatim 
practice and would instead issue a single Opinion of the Court.13 This policy 
revolutionized the Court by fostering a new level of certainty and stability in the 
law while simultaneously establishing the Court as a unified, independent, and 
authoritative institution in the public mind.14 However, even Chief Justice 
Marshall was unable to maintain the Court’s unified voice as decisions began to 
 
 8. Id. at 1779 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 9. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 10. Ledebur, supra note 1, at 901–02; see U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 11. Although the Court would decide a case by a majority vote, each Justice would write a 
separate opinion in support of his decision. See Adam S. Hochschild, Note, The Modern Problem 
of Supreme Court Plurality Decision: Interpretation in Historical Perspective, 4 WASH. U. J. L. & 
POL’Y 261, 263–65 (2000). 
 12. Ledebur, supra note 1, at 901–02. 
 13. Hochschild, supra note 11, at 267. 
 14. Charles F. Hobson, Defining the Office: John Marshall as Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1421, 1443 (2006). 
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be regularly published with multiple opinions towards the end of his term.15 This 
trend has only increased over the two centuries since Chief Justice Marshall’s 
tenure on the Court, as the absence of his legendary leadership and the 
increasingly intricate decisions issued by the Court have created greater 
opportunities for disagreement.16  
Although historically seriatim decisions contained no precedential value 
apart from the judgment as applied to the specific facts of the case, Chief Justice 
Marshall’s legacy created an expectation in American jurisprudence that each 
Supreme Court decision would produce binding precedent which could then be 
used to decide future cases.17 However, when the Court fails to issue a single 
Opinion of the Court endorsed by a majority of the Justices, confusion and 
inconsistency becomes rampant amongst courts and practitioners attempting to 
apply these decisions.18  
The Court attempted to resolve this confusion when, in the 1977 case Marks 
v. United States, Justice Powell authored a majority opinion declaring: “When a 
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result 
enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 
narrowest grounds.”19 At issue in Marks was the precedential force of the 
fractured non-majority decision in the Supreme Court case, A Book Named 
“John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney General of 
Massachusetts,20 which announced three different perspectives on the standard 
that expressive material should meet to sustain a conviction under federal 
obscenity laws.21 The plurality, consisting of Justices Brennan, Warren, and 
Fortas, held that the material must satisfy the highly stringent standard of being 
 
 15. Hochschild, supra note 11, at 268. 
 16. Id. at 272–73. 
 17. Id. at 278–79. 
 18. Thurmon, supra note 4, at 427 & n.44. 
 19. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 n.15 (plurality opinion)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 20. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
 21. While the defendant in Marks was awaiting trial, the Court had issued a new decision 
holding that a defendant could be convicted upon a finding, in part, that the material “lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). In order 
to not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause 
or the Article I Section 9 Ex Post Facto Clause, the Court, before it could apply the new standard 
to the case at bar, would have to find that this new standard did nothing to significantly alter the 
law as established under controlling precedent. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193. The most recent controlling 
case with a majority opinion, Roth v. United States, held that a defendant may be convicted upon 
finding that the objectionable material “appeals primarily to prurient interests.” Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). The Court concluded that the Miller standard did not significantly 
depart from the holding in Roth. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193. However, the Court did find that Miller 
“marked a significant departure from Memoirs” by expanding criminal liability. Id. at 194. 
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“utterly without redeeming social value.”22 Justice Stewart concurred but 
asserted that only “hardcore pornography” should subject a defendant to 
culpability,23 while Justices Black and Douglas took the absolutist view that the 
First Amendment altogether proscribes obscenity prosecutions.24 The Court 
announced that, despite its lack of a majority consensus, Memoirs was in fact 
binding and that its holding was the position taken by the Members who 
concurred on the “narrowest grounds.”25 Without explaining its reasoning, the 
Court identified the Memoirs plurality as the narrowest opinion and concluded 
that the defendant could not be convicted unless the material was “utterly 
without redeeming social value.”26  
III.  THE CURRENT STATE OF THE MARKS DOCTRINE 
A. Hughes v. United States 
Over forty years after the Marks decision, the Court for the first time granted 
certiorari to explain the “narrowest grounds” doctrine in the case Hughes v. 
United States.27 In that case, the defendant entered into a plea agreement 
whereby he agreed to a 180-month sentence after being indicted for participating 
in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.28 Although the sentencing judge 
considered the sentencing guidelines prior to approving the agreement, the 
agreement itself made no mention of the guidelines.29 However, shortly after the 
defendant was sentenced, the Sentencing Commission reduced the applicable 
sentencing range by about three to four years.30 Consequently, the defendant 
filed a motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which 
authorizes a court to reduce a defendant’s sentence if that sentence was “based 
on” sentencing guidelines that have subsequently been lowered by the 
Sentencing Commission.31 
The controlling issue in the case was: when a defendant enters into a plea 
agreement, is the resulting sentence “based on” the Sentencing Guidelines so 
that the defendant may be eligible for a sentence reduction if those guidelines 
 
 22. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418. 
 23. Id. at 421 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 499 
(1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting)). 
 24. Id. at 421, 433 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring) (citing Mishkin v. New York, 383 
U.S. 502, 517-18 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting)). 
 25. Marks, 430 U.S. at 192–94. 
 26. Id. at 194–96. 
 27. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1772; see United States v. Negrón, 837 F.3d 91, 95 n.3 (1st Cir. 
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2293 (2017); United States v. Robison 505 F.3d 1208, 1220–21 (11th 
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1045 (2008). 
 28. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1773–74. 
 29. Id. at 1774. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 1774–75. 
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are subsequently lowered?32 To determine whether the defendant was eligible 
for a reduction in his sentence, the Court looked to guidance from its decision in 
Freeman v. United States, decided seven years earlier.33 That case, which dealt 
with the same issue as in Hughes, produced a fractured plurality decision that 
created three possible interpretations of when a sentence imposed pursuant to a 
plea agreement is “based on” the Sentencing Guidelines.34 The plurality, 
consisting of Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, concluded that as 
long as the sentencing judge’s decision to accept the agreement involves the 
judge consulting the Guidelines, then the sentence is based on the Sentencing 
Guidelines.35 In a dissent, Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, and Alito, argued that a sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement 
is based on the agreement and the agreement alone—not the Sentencing 
Guidelines.36 Justice Sotomayor, on the other hand, concurred in the judgment 
asserting that while the sentence imposed is inherently based on the agreement 
itself, the imposed sentence may nonetheless be based on the Guidelines if either 
the agreement itself calls for the defendant to be sentenced within a particular 
Guidelines range, or the agreement prescribes a specific term of imprisonment, 
but the agreement expressly indicates that the basis for that term is a Guidelines 
sentencing range.37 
The Court in Hughes was therefore confronted with an opportunity to join 
the legion of circuit courts who have already grappled with the endeavor of 
applying Marks to the Freeman decision.38 Three questions were presented to 
the Court. The first two related to the proper application of Marks: (1) whether 
a concurring opinion in a 4–1–4 decision represents the holding of the Court 
where neither the plurality’s reasoning nor the concurrence’s reasoning is a 
logical subset of the other; and (2) whether the lower courts are bound by the 
four-Justice plurality opinion in Freeman, or, instead, by Justice Sotomayor’s 
 
 32. Id. at 1771, 1773. 
 33. 564 U.S. 522 (2011); see Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1771. 
 34. Id. at 525–26. Due to Freeman’s extensive treatment amongst the lower courts, the case 
provided fertile ground for the Court’s decision to finally grant certiorari to a Marks question. See 
Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1942, 1956 tbl.1 (2019) (identifying 
Freeman as the decision most often interpreted in conjunction with an express citation to the Marks 
rule within the federal circuit courts). 
 35. Freeman, 564 U.S. at 529–30, 534. Because a judge is statutorily required to consult the 
Sentencing Guidelines prior to accepting a plea agreement, the plurality concluded that any 
accepted plea agreement is likely to be “based on” the Guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) 
(2012). 
 36. Freeman, 564 U.S. at 544 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 37. Id. at 538–39 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Because the agreement in Freeman stated that 
the proposed 106-month sentence was determined pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines, Justice 
Sotomayor joined the plurality in holding that the defendant was eligible for a sentence reduction. 
Id. at 542. 
 38. See Re, supra note 34, at 1956 tbl.1. 
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concurrence with which all the other Justices disagreed.39 The third question, on 
the other hand, directly addressed the substantive issue of whether a defendant 
who enters into a plea agreement is generally eligible for a sentence reduction if 
there is a later amendment to the Guidelines.40 
The Court, however, declined to address the Marks issues and instead 
proceeded to resolve the substantive issue without deferring to its decision in 
Freeman.41 The Court adhered to the plurality’s reasoning in Freeman and held 
that because the sentencing judge is required to consult the Sentencing 
Guidelines prior to accepting a plea agreement, the imposed sentence will 
therefore usually be “based on” the Guidelines.42 Interestingly, as in Freeman, 
Justice Sotomayor again wrote a separate concurrence; however, this time she 
explained that while she continued to believe that her Freeman concurrence 
expressed the right approach, she recognized that Freeman had contributed to 
confusion and discord amongst the lower courts and litigants, and she thereby 
joined the majority in full in order to “ensure clarity and stability in the law and 
promote[] uniformity in sentencing imposed by different federal courts for 
similar criminal conduct.”43 
B. Interpretations of Marks 
The lack of clarity and stability in the law that followed the Freeman 
decision can be attributed to competing interpretations amongst the circuits 
regarding what exactly it means to apply the reasoning of the Justices who 
concurred on the narrowest grounds.44 The circuit split following Freeman 
exemplified two of these interpretations. The first is the “fifth-vote” approach. 
Under the fifth-vote rule, a decision will produce a binding Marks holding even 
if there is no common ground in reasoning between the plurality and the 
concurrences.45 Instead, the fifth-vote rule looks to the results of the decision 
and then identifies the narrowest position necessary to produce those results (or 
the “fifth vote” that resulted in the majority judgment).46 The inquiry, therefore, 
 
 39. Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2018). Unlike Freeman, the defendant 
here would be ineligible for a sentence reduction under Justice Sotomayor’s reasoning because the 
agreement in Hughes made no mention of the Sentencing Guidelines. See id. at 1774. 
 40. Id. at 1772. 
 41. Id. One of the dissenters in Freeman, Justice Scalia, had since been replaced by Justice 
Gorsuch who endorsed the Freeman plurality’s reasoning and thereby provided the fifth vote 
necessary to produce the majority opinion in Hughes that was lacking in Freeman. 
 42. Id. at 1776. The Court further reasoned that this interpretation was most consistent with 
the Sentencing Reform Act’s purpose of ensuring uniform sentencing treatment amongst 
defendants. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(6), 3582(c)(2). 
 43. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1779 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 44. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
 45. John P. Neuenkirchen, Plurality Decisions, Implicit Consensuses, and the Fifth-Vote Rule 
Under Marks v. United States, 19 WIDENER L. REV. 387, 399 (2013). 
 46. Id. at 400. 
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is: if satisfied, which position, taken by itself, would necessarily produce results 
in future cases that a majority of Justices would agree with?47 For example, 
recall that in Freeman, four Justices voted in favor of eligibility for a sentence 
reduction because the sentencing judge was required to consult the Sentencing 
Guidelines prior to accepting the plea agreement and therefore, the sentence 
imposed was based on the Guidelines.48 Justice Sotomayor, on the other hand, 
who provided the critical fifth vote, agreed that the defendant was eligible for a 
sentence reduction, but only because his agreement expressly stated that the 
proposed sentence was determined pursuant to the Guidelines.49 Therefore, in 
future cases, as long as Justice Sotomayor’s standard is satisfied, at least five of 
the Freeman Justices (the plurality and Justice Sotomayor) would agree that the 
defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction. The same cannot be said if only 
the plurality’s reasoning is applied. Such was the case in Hughes, where the plea 
agreement made no mention of the Guidelines.50 Under the Freeman plurality’s 
standard, the defendant in Hughes would still be eligible for a reduction.51 
However, Justice Sotomayor’s standard was not satisfied and therefore, under 
the fifth-vote rule, she would not have voted in favor of a sentence reduction.52 
Consequently, had it used this approach, the Freeman Court would have held 
the defendant in Hughes to be ineligible for a sentence reduction.53 
On the other side of the Freeman split were the Ninth and D.C. Circuits.54 
These courts followed the “logical subset” approach, which recognizes a Marks 
holding only when one opinion represents a “common denominator” of the 
Court’s reasoning.55 In other words, the narrowest opinion is one that must be 
implicitly approved by at least five Justices who support the judgment.56 This 
occurs when one position posits a narrow test to which the other must necessarily 
agree as a logical consequence of its own, broader position.57 The D.C. Circuit, 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 529–30, 534 (2011). 
 49. Id. at 542. 
 50. Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2018). 
 51. See Freeman, 564 U.S. at 529–30, 534. 
 52. Id. at 538–39 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 53. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 687 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Even though eight 
Justices disagreed with Justice Sotomayor’s approach . . . her reasoning provided the narrowest, 
most case-specific basis for deciding Freeman.”). 
 54. United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. Epps, 
707 F.3d 337, 350 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 55. King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991); but see Re, supra note 34, at 1981 
(acknowledging that proponents of the logical subset approach nonetheless generally focus on 
outcomes rather than legal principles that are implicitly endorsed by a majority of Justices). 
 56. King, 950 F.2d at 781. 
 57. Epps, 707 F.3d at 348. 
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in King v. Palmer,58 explained the logical subset approach by returning to the 
Memoirs case. The court identified Justices Black and Douglas’s absolutist 
position as the broadest approach.59 It then recognized Justice Stewart’s view 
that only “hardcore pornography” may qualify as obscenity as the next narrowest 
approach, followed by the plurality’s view that the material must be “utterly 
without redeeming social value” to be considered obscene.60 The logic is as 
follows: all material that has redeeming social value must not be hardcore 
pornography, and material that is not hardcore pornography must also be 
protected under Justices Black and Douglas’s absolutist First Amendment 
view.61 Thus, while only three Justices would agree that anything that is not 
hardcore pornography is protected under the First Amendment, all five Justices 
would agree that anything with redeeming social value is protected, and this 
viewpoint therefore has implicit majority support.62 
It is not surprising if the reader is now left scratching her head. The logical 
subset approach is ironically fraught with illogicalities and has been heavily 
criticized by commentators.63 Put simply, the fact that a decision produces a 
separate concurrence indicates that some Justices do not accept the narrower 
rule, which conflicts with the majoritarian principles underlying the Marks 
doctrine.64 One of the rule’s errors lies in the “fallacy of division,” or the 
principle that the characteristics of the whole do not necessarily share the 
characteristics of its component parts.65 A slight tweaking of the Memoirs 
plurality’s rule can produce a knee-jerk response sufficient to illustrate this 
point. Imagine that Justices Black and Douglas continued to hold their views 
that obscenity prosecutions are categorically unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment.66 Now, however, imagine that instead of prohibiting an obscenity 
 
 58. 950 F.2d at 781. Freeman would not provide an apt example of the “logical subset” 
approach because the 9th and D.C. Circuits held that Marks was inapplicable because no opinion 
in Freeman was a logical subset of another. Davis, 825 F.3d at 1021–22; Epps, 707 F.3d at 350. 
 59. King, 950 F.2d at 781. 
 60. Id. (quoting Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418–19 (1966)). 
 61. See id. at 781 & n.6. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See Re, supra note 34, at 1981–84 (2019); Thurmon, supra note 4, at 432; Adam Steinman, 
Nonmajority Opinions and Biconditional Rules, 128 YALE L.J. F. 1, 11–14 (2018) (discussing the 
fallibility of the logical subset approach specifically in relation to biconditional (“if-and-only-if”) 
rules); Ken Kimura, A Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of Plurality Decisions, 77 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1593, 1604 (1992). 
 64. Kimura, supra note 63, at 1604. 
 65. Michael Herz, Justice Byron White and the Argument That the Greater Includes the 
Lesser, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 243 (1994). It is useful to consider the analogy that while table 
salt is a harmless substance, it is not true that its component elements, sodium and chlorine, are 
harmless by themselves. Id. 
 66. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 421, 433 (1966) (Black & Douglas, JJ., 
concurring). 
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conviction unless the material is “utterly without redeeming social value,”67 the 
plurality instead held that an obscenity conviction is prohibited unless the 
material depicts interracial couples. The logical subset approach assumes that 
Justices Black and Douglas would necessarily agree with this rule as a logical 
consequence of their own broader approach to First Amendment rights (the 
plurality rule would protect much of the same material as the absolutist rule 
would).68 However, it can hardly be argued that such ardent proponents of 
Constitutional rights would implicitly support a blatantly discriminatory rule 
even if it upholds First Amendment rights in many—perhaps even most—
cases.69 In fact, it is likely that they would sooner support a categorical bar on 
all sexually explicit material before they would support a rule that discriminates 
based on race.70 True, the Memoirs plurality’s test did not involve such an 
appallingly blatant violation of Constitutional rights, but the principle that this 
hypothetical illustrates is the same: support for the broad position does not 
necessarily entail support for another position that places a limiting condition on 
the applicability of the broader position’s rule.71 
The “logical subset” rule also fails when it is applied to decisions containing 
biconditional rules (“if-and-only-if” rules).72 For example, assume that, contrary 
to the Ninth and D.C. Circuits’ determinations,73 Justice Sotomayor’s 
concurrence in Freeman was in fact a logical subset of the plurality opinion.74 
Both the plurality’s rule and Justice Sotomayor’s rule could both be understood 
as biconditional rules.75 According to Justice Sotomayor, if the plea agreement 
expressly refers to the Sentencing Guidelines, then the defendant would be 
eligible for a sentence reduction.76 If the agreement does not expressly refer to 
the Guidelines, then the defendant would not be eligible.77 The plurality, on the 
other hand, would grant eligibility if either the agreement itself expressly 
referred to the Sentencing Guidelines or the Sentencing Guidelines were 
 
 67. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418. 
 68. See King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 69. See Re, supra note 34, at 1983. Justices Black and Douglas both joined the unanimous 
decision in Loving v. Virginia, issued the year after the Memoirs decision, which declared a state 
statue prohibiting miscegenation unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967). 
 70. See Re, supra note 34, at 1983. 
 71. See id. 
 72. Steinman, supra note 63, at 12–14. 
 73. United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. Epps, 
707 F.3d 337, 350 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 74. See Steinman, supra note 63, at 11–12, 14; see also United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 665 
F.3d 344, 348 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 75. Steinman, supra note 63, at 11. 
 76. Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 538–39 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 77. Id. 
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otherwise relevant to the sentencing judge in accepting the agreement.78 If the 
agreement neither expressly referred to the Guidelines nor were the Guidelines 
otherwise relevant to the judge accepting the agreement, then the defendant 
would not be eligible.79 In every case in which Justice Sotomayor would grant 
eligibility, the plurality would necessarily grant eligibility as well.80 However, 
the same cannot be said for the inverse. There could be cases, like the one 
presented in Hughes,81 where Justice Sotomayor’s rule would deny eligibility 
while the plurality’s rule would not.82 Instead, in cases denying eligibility, the 
plurality’s rule now becomes the logical subset of Justice Sotomayor’s rule!83 
Thus, when opinions rely on rules containing biconditional logic, no single 
opinion can be the logical subset of another.84 
Although the fifth-vote rule has been less heavily criticized than the logical 
subset approach,85 it too is problematic. The main criticism is that under this 
rule, the views of a single Justice can become binding even though all eight other 
Justices might disagree.86 Additionally, views of dissenting Justices could seep 
into a concurring Justice’s opinion, giving precedential weight to a dissenting 
viewpoint.87 There is also a more subtle analytical problem with this rule. The 
idea behind the fifth-vote rule is that the Justice providing the fifth vote 
necessary for the judgment encapsulates the reasoning that would produce the 
same results in the future.88 However, the predictive ability of the fifth-vote rule 
is significantly lessened when the reasoning is applied to cases that bear only 
some resemblance to the case that produced the opinion.89 Take, for example, 
Baldasar v. Illinois, where the Court considered whether a prior uncounseled 
misdemeanor conviction could be used to convert a subsequent misdemeanor 
 
 78. Id. at 530 (2011) (“[M]odification proceedings should be available to permit the district 
court to revisit a prior sentence to whatever extent the sentencing range in question was a relevant 
part of the analytic framework the judge used to determine the sentence or to approve the 
agreement.”) (emphasis added). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Steinman, supra note 63, at 14. 
 81. Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2018). 
 82. Steinman, supra note 63, at 14. 
 83. If the plurality would deny eligibility, then Justice Sotomayor would necessarily deny 
eligibility as well. Id. 
 84. Id. at 12. 
 85. See, e.g., Neuenkirchen, supra note 45, at 388; Thurmon, supra note 4, at 435; Re, supra 
note 34, at 1984. 
 86. Neuenkirchen, supra note 45, at 407. 
 87. Ryan C. Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and Precedential Constraint, 
69 STAN. L. REV. 795, 815 (2017). For example, in Freeman, Justice Sotomayor agreed with the 
dissent that the sentence is based on the plea agreement itself and not the judge’s calculation of the 
Sentencing Guidelines, as the plurality asserted. Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 534 
(2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 88. Thurmon, supra note 4, at 436. 
 89. Id. 
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into a felony with an increased prison term under an enhanced penalty statute.90 
In a short per curiam opinion, the Court held that it may not.91 However, the 
decision yielded three different concurrences, each providing a different 
rationale for the result. Justice Stewart reasoned that because the defendant was 
only being sentenced to an increased prison term because of the prior 
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, his Sixth Amendment rights were thereby 
violated.92 Justice Marshall, on the other hand, argued that without the assistance 
of counsel, the prior conviction was “not sufficiently reliable to support the 
severe sanction of imprisonment.”93 Finally, Justice Blackmun reiterated his 
views from his dissent in Scott v. Illinois, and maintained that the prior 
conviction was invalid for all purposes because the Sixth Amendment requires 
a defendant to be provided with counsel whenever the defendant is prosecuted 
for an offense punishable by more than six months’ imprisonment or whenever 
the defendant is actually sentenced to imprisonment.94 
Later, in Nichols v. United States, the Court was required to apply the 
Baldasar decision to determine whether a defendant who had already been 
convicted of a felony and subjected to imprisonment could receive an increased 
sentence because of a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction.95 Although 
there had been considerable confusion within the lower courts as to which 
concurrence in Baldasar represented the narrowest grounds for the decision,96 
the Court recognized that Justice Blackmun’s opinion represented the “fifth 
vote.”97 The defendant in Nichols had previously been convicted of driving 
under the influence (DUI), which was a misdemeanor punishable by up to one 
year’s imprisonment.98 Under Justice Blackmun’s reasoning, this prior 
uncounseled conviction was invalid because it was punishable by more than six 
months’ imprisonment and therefore, it could not be used in the present case to 
increase the defendant’s term of imprisonment.99 However, unlike Baldasar, 
 
 90. 446 U.S. 222, 223 (1980). In a prior case, Scott v. Illinois, the Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment only requires that a defendant be afforded the right to counsel if the defendant is 
actually sentenced to a term of imprisonment, regardless of whether the offense might be 
punishable by imprisonment. 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979). 
 91. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 224. 
 92. Id. (Stewart, J. concurring). 
 93. Id. at 227 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 94. Id. at 229 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 95. 511 U.S. 738, 740–41 (1994). 
 96. Id. at 745. 
 97. Id. at 744; see also Santillanes v. United States Parole Commission, 754 F.2d 887, 889 
(10th Cir. 1985) (interpreting Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in Baldasar to rest on the narrowest 
grounds because, unlike Justices Stewart and Marshall, Justice Blackmun asserted that so long as 
a prior conviction is Constitutionally valid then it may be used for a sentence enhancement in a 
future case). 
 98. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 740 & n.1. 
 99. See Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 229 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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where the defendant would not be facing a felony conviction carrying a term of 
imprisonment but for the prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction,100 the 
defendant in Nichols had already been convicted of a felony and was already 
facing imprisonment.101 Acknowledging this distinction, which led both the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals to deny the defendant’s objection to the 
inclusion of the DUI misdemeanor conviction in calculating his prison sentence, 
the Court proceeded to overrule Baldasar and held that the prior DUI conviction 
could be used to increase the sentence because the defendant was not actually 
imprisoned for the DUI.102 Even though Justice Blackmun remained steadfast in 
the beliefs articulated in his Baldasar concurrence,103 the Court took a different 
path largely because of the factual dissimilarity in Nichols. Thus, despite the 
“fifth-vote” rule’s purpose of applying the reasoning which can accurately 
predict how the Court will rule in future cases,104 the factual divergence in 
Nichols undermined the rule’s underlying logic by leading the Court to a 
conclusion in direct conflict with the conclusion necessitated by Justice 
Blackmun’s Baldasar concurrence. 
C. The Court’s History of Criticizing and Undermining Marks 
The Court has long been aware of the problems created by its Marks 
decision. While it has been happy to apply the doctrine to cases where it found 
a clear narrower holding,105 the Court has not been shy about voicing its 
criticism of the doctrine in those more difficult cases. Prior to overruling 
Baldasar, the Court in Nichols acknowledged that Marks was applicable to 
properly interpreting Baldasar.106 However, noting the confusion that the 
fractured Baldasar decision had caused within the lower courts, the Court 
acknowledged that the Marks test is often “more easily stated than applied.”107 
In light of this confusion, the Court declared that it was “not useful to pursue the 
Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled 
 
 100. Id. at 223. 
 101. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 740–41. 
 102. Id. at 748–49 (maintaining that this holding was the “logical consequence” of the Scott 
decision). 
 103. See id. at 756 & n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 104. Neuenkirchen, supra note 45, at 400. 
 105. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 949 (2007) (identifying Justice Powell’s 
concurrence in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411–12 (1986), as the “more limited holding” 
without explaining its reasoning or suggesting any difficulty in making this determination); O’Dell 
v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 162 (1997) (expressing similar ease in determining that Justice 
White’s concurring opinion in Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 363–64 (1977) was the narrowest 
holding); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 764 n.9 (1988) (refuting the 
dissent’s position that the plurality opinion in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85–86 (1949) was 
not controlling because the Kovacs plurality “clearly” put forth the narrowest rationale). 
 106. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745. 
 107. Id. 
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and divided the lower courts that have considered it,” and it proceeded to 
reexamine and overrule Baldasar.108 
The Court again declined to apply Marks in Grutter v. Bollinger, a case that 
presented the question of whether a public university could justify considering 
race as one of many factors in selecting applicants for admission on the grounds 
of ensuring diversity within the institution.109 In a landmark case on affirmative 
action, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the Court held that, 
while a public university could not be altogether prohibited from considering 
race in its admissions program, the program could not be designed to assure 
admission to a specified number of students from certain minority groups.110 
Again, that decision generated three different opinions, none of which were 
endorsed by a majority of the Court. Four Justices held the program invalid 
because they found that it violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,111 
while four other Justices would have upheld the program because the 
discrimination was not to demean or insult, but rather to remedy past racial 
prejudice.112 Justice Powell, who provided the fifth vote, asserted that while an 
admissions program may not focus solely on ethnic diversity, race may be 
considered as a single element amongst a broader array of qualifications and 
characteristics in order to ensure a kind of diversity that furthers a compelling 
state interest.113 
Although Justice Powell’s opinion had come to serve as the “touchstone for 
constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions policies,”114 lower courts 
were nonetheless divided over whether his opinion was in fact binding.115 In 
light of this disagreement, the Court in Grutter again took the liberty to bypass 
the Marks question because it had “so obviously baffled and divided the lower 
courts.”116 The Court adhered to Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke and found a 
compelling state interest in promoting institutional diversity while holding that 
the university may further that interest by considering an applicant’s race in 
 
 108. Id. at 745–46. 
 109. 539 U.S. 306, 319, 322 (2003). 
 110. 438 U.S. 265, 269–72 (1978). 
 111. Id. at 412 (Stevens, J., concurring in part). 
 112. Id. at 325 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). 
 113. Id. at 315. 
 114. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319, 322. 
 115. Compare Johnson v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 563 F.3d 1234, 1245 (11th Cir. 
2001) (Justice Powell’s opinion was not binding); Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 274–275 (5th 
Cir. 2000) (same); with Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law School, 233 F.3d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(finding Justice Powell’s opinion to be the “narrowest footing” upon which a race-conscious 
decision making process could stand). 
 116. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319, 325 (quoting Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745–46 
(1994)). 
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order to promote the robust exchange of ideas and to prepare students for an 
increasingly diverse workforce and society.117  
Then came Hughes. Although, unlike in Nichols and Grutter, the Court 
never explicitly expressed a difficulty in applying Marks to the case,118 the Court 
could not hide its disapproval for the doctrine. By refusing to address the Marks 
question in what may have arguably been the most apropos case to come before 
it,119 the Court has effectively voiced its aversion to the doctrine.120 However, it 
was Justice Sotomayor who verbalized in her concurrence what the rest of the 
Court was undoubtedly thinking: Marks has done little to promote “consistency, 
predictability, and evenhandedness” in the criminal justice system, but instead 
has “contributed to ongoing discord among the lower courts, sown confusion 
among litigants, and left the governing rule uncertain.”121 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF HUGHES 
A. The Future of Marks 
The question now remains as to the future of the doctrine post-Hughes. 
While optimists may understand Hughes as the beginning of the end for Marks, 
it is of course possible that Marks is here to stay. However, in light of the Court 
admitting to the confusion that Marks has caused, coupled with its inconsistency 
in applying the doctrine, lower courts will be left wondering what their own 
obligations are to follow the doctrine. Looking back to Nichols, courts can find 
helpful guidance. By taking that Court’s refusal to find the narrowest ground as 
precedent, a lower court deciding a Marks issue can ask if a fractured opinion 
has obviously baffled and divided lower courts, and if so, then that court may 
choose to disregard Marks and apply whichever position that it finds most 
compelling.122 Rather than requiring lower courts to find a Marks holding in 
every single plurality decision that they are faced with, this rule would in fact be 
more in line with their duty to follow Supreme Court precedent. Under Marks, 
when the Court issues a plurality opinion, it theoretically creates binding 
precedent which is found in the opinion that concurred on the narrowest 
 
 117. Id. at 329–30. 
 118. See Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2018). 
 119. See Re, supra note 34, at 1956 tbl.1 (identifying Freeman as the decision most often 
interpreted in conjunction with an express citation to the Marks rule within the federal circuit 
courts). 
 120. See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 84-87 
(1960) (a court may avoid adhering to a precedent without expressly overruling it by choosing to 
not apply the precedent to the problem at hand). 
 121. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1779 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 
332, 354 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 122. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745–46 (1994). 
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grounds.123 However, by choosing not to follow the doctrine in difficult 
circumstances, the Court effectively overrules this precedent that lower courts 
had been obliged to follow.124 At the same time, the Supreme Court is quick to 
abandon the Marks doctrine without affording it the degree of deference that it 
usually gives to its own precedents.125 By following the Court’s lead in Nichols 
and Grutter, lower courts can mimic the Supreme Court’s approach to Marks: 
follow the rule when it’s easy to do so, throw it out when the going gets tough.126  
Support for this approach can be found in the Marks decision itself. A close 
examination of the wording used to articulate the Marks rule reveals that the 
holding of the Court may—not shall—be viewed as the narrowest grounds 
position.127 Furthermore, upon adopting this rule and finding the Memoirs 
plurality as constituting the narrowest grounds in that decision, the Court in 
Marks acknowledged that every lower court to consider the issue had come to 
the same conclusion.128 Therefore, it is quite possible that the Marks doctrine 
was never intended to apply to the baffling and divisive situations encountered 
in Nichols and Grutter.129 
The Court has suggested that it would condone lower courts following this 
approach. In Rapanos v. United States, the Court was asked to decide whether 
certain wetlands were “waters of the United States” for the purpose of 
establishing federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act.130 The plurality 
opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, concluded that only wetlands with a 
“continuous surface connection” to a relatively permanent body of water 
connected to traditional interstate navigable waters were subject to federal 
jurisdiction.131 Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, asserted in his concurrence 
that the proper test should instead be whether the wetlands possess a “significant 
nexus” to navigable waterways.132 The decision was an anomaly in terms of 
Marks. Neither test was inherently narrower than the other and although Justice 
Scalia’s was stricter in that it required a physical connection to a navigable 
waterway, certain situations could exist where Justice Scalia’s test would find 
federal jurisdiction while Justice Kennedy’s would not.133 In a separate 
 
 123. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
 124. Thurmon, supra note 4, at 441–42. 
 125. Id. at 442. 
 126. See id. 
 127. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193. 
 128. Id. at 194. 
 129. See Re, supra note 34, at 1996. 
 130. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 729 (2006). 
 131. Id. at 742. 
 132. Id. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 133. Joseph M. Cacace, Plurality Decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States: A 
Reexamination of the Marks Doctrine After Rapanos v. United States, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 97, 
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concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts lamented the Court’s failure to deliver a 
majority opinion and, citing the Court’s decision in Grutter to disregard the 
Marks rule, observed that lower courts interpreting the holding would have to 
“feel their way on a case-by-case basis.”134 Dissenting, Justice Stevens directed 
lower courts to forgo the Marks analysis and find jurisdiction if either the 
plurality’s rule or Justice Kennedy’s rule is satisfied.135 Therefore, the 
impossibility of properly applying the Marks doctrine to the Rapanos decision, 
combined with Justices Roberts and Stevens’ direction to lower courts to 
interpret the fractured decision without regard to Marks, indicates that the Court 
would approve of lower courts disregarding the doctrine in difficult cases. 
Furthermore, Hughes itself suggests that the Court would approve of lower 
courts discarding the Marks doctrine in exceptionally confusing circumstances. 
In choosing not to apply Marks, the Court in Hughes abrogated the decisions of 
eight different circuit courts in their earnest attempts to apply the doctrine to the 
Freeman problem.136 Instead of taking guidance from the wisdom of eight 
circuits as to the proper application of Marks and following Justice Sotomayor’s 
concurrence, the Court instead placed its stamp of approval on the conclusion 
reached by a small minority of circuits who cast Marks aside and applied the 
plurality opinion, finding it most persuasive.137 In light of Justice Sotomayor’s 
comment that her Freeman concurrence had “contributed to ongoing discord 
among the lower courts” and “sown confusion among litigants,”138 the Court’s 
refusal to follow what appeared to be binding precedent under Marks may 
therefore be construed as an invitation for the lower courts to do the same when 
faced with a similarly confusing decision.139 
 
a navigable waterway, but that connection is so insubstantial that there is no significant nexus to 
the waterway. Id. 
 134. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306, 325 (2003)). 
 135. Id. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although the four dissenting Justices recognized much 
broader authority in the Executive to regulate the Nation’s waters, all four of those Justices would 
find federal jurisdiction in all cases in which either the plurality or Justice Kennedy finds 
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Justice Stevens’s approach to the issue, finding federal jurisdiction if either test is satisfied would 
likely be the most compelling interpretation of the Rapanos decision for the reasons articulated by 
Justice Stevens. See id. 
 136. Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1771, 1774–75 (2018) (abrogating United States 
v. Benitez, 822 F.3d 807, 811 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Graham, 704 F.3d 1275, 1277–78 
(10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Thompson, 682 F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Browne, 698 F.3d 1042, 1045 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Dixon, 687 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 
2012); United States v. Brown, 653 F.3d 337, 340 n.1 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Smith, 658 
F.3d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 665 F.3d 344, 348 (1st Cir. 2011)). 
 137. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1771, 1774–75 (citing United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014, 1021–
22 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. Epps, 707 F.3d 337, 350 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). 
 138. Hughes, 138 S Ct. at 1779 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 139. See Thurmon, supra note 4, at 441–42. 
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Despite Court precedent suggesting that Marks should not be followed in 
cases where the doctrine has “so obviously baffled and divided the lower courts 
that have considered it,”140 it must be remembered that Marks has not yet been 
overruled and is therefore still good law. Some might argue that now, after 
Hughes, Marks has been so seriously undermined that it does not represent 
present doctrine.141 Under the once-tenable doctrine of “implicit overrule,” a 
lower court might conclude that Marks is dead and accordingly choose to not 
follow the doctrine, thereby saving the Supreme Court the hassle of having to 
address a Marks issue in the future.142 After eagerly throwing out the Marks 
issues in Hughes, the Court might welcome the prospect of never having to 
wrestle with the doctrine again. Although there was a time in history where a 
lower court might feel free to save the Court the hassle of having to formally 
overrule its own outdated and eroded precedents, the Court has since—some 
would argue foolishly—143 foreclosed this option.144  
The Court owes it to both the lower courts and to itself to finally put an end 
to the confusion created by Marks. If it is true that now, after having again been 
criticized and ultimately disregarded in Hughes, the doctrine no longer 
represents the present state of the law, the Court must say so.145 This was the 
burden that the Court took on in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American 
Express, Inc., when it forbade lower courts from coming to a conclusion about 
the viability of precedent themselves.146 That case considered whether 
arbitration agreements were valid under the Securities Act of 1933.147 While the 
1953 case Wilko v. Swan held that such agreements were not valid under the 
1933 Act,148 a later case, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 
rejected the rationale in Wilko and held that arbitration agreements were in fact 
valid under the 1934 Act, despite the 1934 Act and the 1933 Act containing 
 
 140. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745–46 (1994). 
 141. See David C. Bratz, Stare Decisis in Lower Courts: Predicting the Demise of Supreme 
Court Precedent, 60 WASH. L. REV. 87, 92 (1984). 
 142. See id. at 93. 
 143. C. Steven Bradford, Following Dead Precedent: The Supreme Court’s Ill-Advised 
Rejection of Anticipatory Overruling, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 42 (1990). 
 144. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (chastising 
lower courts for concluding that the Supreme Court had undermined its own precedent to the extent 
that they were not obliged to follow the precedent even though the Court, in the following sentences 
of the Opinion, proceeded to overrule the precedent itself). 
 145. Albert P. Blaustein & Andrew H. Field, “Overruling” Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 
MICH. L. REV. 151, 173 (1958) (recognizing that it is necessary for the Court to expressly overrule 
a prior decision when that decision has already been implicitly overruled, but the Court has 
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 146. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484. 
 147. Id. at 478. 
 148. 346 U.S. 427, 434–35 (1953). 
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virtually identical provisions governing the waiver of judicial trial and review.149 
Although logic would dictate that McMahon had overruled Wilko, lower courts 
were nonetheless bound to follow this inviable precedent, making its formal 
overruling in Rodriguez necessary. 
Similarly, a lower court might conclude that the Court’s refusal in Hughes 
to apply the Marks doctrine is strong evidence that the doctrine no longer reflects 
the current state of the law. Until the Court expressly overrules Marks, though, 
lower courts will have to continue to weed through a mess of concurring 
opinions trying to identify the narrowest rationale, all while knowing that under 
Hughes the correct result in the eyes of the Court might be the one reached not 
by finding the narrowest grounds, but instead by disregarding Marks entirely.150 
A formal overruling is therefore necessary. 
In addition to making explicit what is already implicit, it is necessary for the 
Court to overrule a prior decision when that decision is impracticable and has 
resulted in “great hardship or inconvenience.”151 Continuing to follow a decision 
that has resulted in such hardship directly contravenes the policies that the Court 
has identified as underlying stare decisis: clear guidance provided by the law to 
govern conduct, fair and expeditious adjudication, and public faith in the 
judiciary as a source of reasoned judgment.152 The Court in the past has not 
hesitated to overrule a prior decision when a failure to do so would do violence 
to these policies. At the risk of causing nightmares amongst any first-year Civil 
Procedure students reading this article, a brief examination of the famous 
overruling decision, Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins,153 can illustrate this 
point. That case, of course, overruled the nearly century-old precedent 
established in Swift v. Tyson that directed federal courts sitting in diversity to not 
apply the common law as established by the state’s highest court, but to instead 
apply general and widely-accepted legal reasoning and principles to determine 
the outcome of a case.154 In overruling Swift, Justice Brandeis noted the 
“injustice and confusion” caused by the impossibility of drawing a clear line 
between “general law” and local law, the inherent unfairness in allowing a 
plaintiff to seek more favorable laws merely by filing a diversity action in federal 
court, and the violation of federalist principles that occurs when the federal 
judiciary infringes upon a state’s exclusive lawmaking authority.155 
Likewise, continuing to follow Marks would offend stare decisis principles, 
which necessitates its overruling. As aptly acknowledged by Justice Sotomayor 
in Hughes, Marks has done anything but provide clear guidance in determining 
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 150. See Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1771, 1775 (2018). 
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 152. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970). 
 153. 304 U.S. 64, 64 (1938). 
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eligibility for a sentence reduction.156 To the contrary, the doctrine has “left the 
governing rule uncertain,” led to the unequal treatment of criminal defendants 
based on the circuit in which the case arose, and has undermined the “integrity 
and legitimacy” of the American justice system.157 Thus, if the past is any 
indication of the Court’s willingness to overrule faulty doctrine when necessary, 
then it is only a matter of time before the Court will announce the ultimate 
demise of Marks. 
B. In the Absence of Marks 
If Marks’s days truly are numbered, then how should courts interpret 
plurality decisions in its absence, and more fundamentally, must troublesome 
non-majority decisions continue to afflict Supreme Court jurisprudence at all? 
Historically, the precedential value of a plurality opinion had been limited 
to the specific result of the decision.158 Non-majority opinions would therefore 
be merely persuasive and the decision would be binding on future cases only to 
the extent that the future case had a nearly identical fact pattern to the prior 
case.159 While this was not a problem throughout the nineteenth and the first half 
of the twentieth centuries, plurality decisions are far more common today.160 
Although this method would certainly remedy much of the confusion created by 
Marks and free lower courts to come to their own legal conclusions when 
considering the various non-majority opinions for their persuasive value, 
returning to this method would result in a large percentage of Court decisions 
that offer very little guidance in future cases, thereby contributing to the same 
disparate and unfair treatment that Marks has been criticized for causing.161  
Admittedly, there is no perfect solution. However, a rule making the 
plurality opinion precedent provides a compelling alternative to the traditional 
approach of according no precedential weight to plurality decisions. Like the 
traditional approach, the value of this rule lies in its simplicity.162 On the other 
hand, like Marks, this rule is vulnerable to attack in that it violates democratic 
principles by allowing less than a majority of the Court to set binding 
precedent.163 It also encounters problems when there is an even split among the 
concurring Justices.164 Nevertheless, its saving feature is that, unlike the Marks 
rule which could allow the views of a single justice to become binding 
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precedent,165 this rule would create binding precedent from a position adopted 
by the “majority of the majority.”166  
Other more creative solutions have been proposed as well. One approach, 
known as the “hybrid approach,” incorporates elements of the two previously 
mentioned alternatives with the Marks doctrine itself.167 Under this approach, a 
court interpreting a fragmented decision would first identify the rationes 
decidendi, or the reasoning necessary to reach the conclusions (as opposed to 
dicta), in the various plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions.168 Once the 
rationes decidendi have been identified, a court would then determine which 
ones share the support of at least five justices.169 The ones that have majority 
support would then be binding authority while the ones that do not would merely 
be persuasive and their persuasiveness would be correlated to the number of 
justices that supported the particular ratio decidendi.170 While this approach 
would both cure the Marks defect of giving precedential weight to non-majority 
positions and further the Marks goal of establishing binding rules of law in 
fractured decisions, this approach threatens to be more complex and challenging 
to apply than Marks itself, especially because it is often difficult to identify the 
exact ratio decidendi in an opinion.171 
Another inventive solution is known as the “legitimacy model.” This model 
would place each opinion in a fractured decision into one of five different 
categories.172 Whether the opinion is binding depends on its category, and the 
categories are delineated by considering the extent to which they promote the 
principles of precedential legitimacy: a judgment supported by a majority, the 
need for a reasoned outcome, and a nexus between the two.173 While a detailed 
description of the legitimacy model, its categories, and the purpose behind the 
model is far beyond the scope of this analysis, suffice it to say that the legitimacy 
model is extraordinarily complex and, if none of a fractured decision’s opinions 
fall into a category that is accorded precedential weight by the model, the 
decision would yield no binding precedent whatsoever.174 
There is a better option. Nothing prohibits the Court from changing its rules 
to eliminate plurality decisions.175 A majority vote is all that would be needed 
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to effect such a change.176 Prior to the recent death of Justice Ginsburg, at least 
five of the Justices on the Court had either expressed outright dissatisfaction 
with non-majority opinions or have endorsed opinions criticizing Marks. 177 
Although Justice Barrett has not yet weighed in on Marks, a majority vote to 
change the rule nonetheless looks promising. 
This raises the question: how might five Justices all agree on a single 
majority opinion? It may not be as difficult as one might expect. Marks in fact 
promotes dissension by incentivizing the Justices to write the “narrowest” 
opinion so that their own personal views might become binding precedent.178 
Eliminating the Marks doctrine would therefore promote cohesion. Furthermore, 
despite the flurry of concurrences and dissents coming out of the Court these 
days, the Justices have shown a willingness to acquiesce to the majority when 
necessary to provide better guidance to lower courts.179 The Justices have even 
demonstrated an ability to reconcile their differing views to come to a single 
majority opinion that is acceptable to all. In Arizona v. Gant, the Court held that 
police may search a vehicle incident to an arrest only when the arrestee is 
unsecured and has access to the passenger compartment at the time of the 
search.180 Justice Scalia, on the other hand, would have held that a vehicle search 
incident to arrest is reasonable only when the object of the search is to discover 
evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made or evidence of another crime 
that the officer has probable cause to believe occurred.181 In order to gain Justice 
Scalia’s deciding vote, the Court followed Justice Scalia’s suggestion and 
further held that a search incident to arrest may also be lawful when his evidence 
of a crime criteria is met.182 This case thus demonstrates the Court’s willingness 
to adopt a rule that neither the majority nor the concurrence fully embraced, but 
was nonetheless acceptable to all. 
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It might be argued that a rule requiring each judicial decision to result in a 
single binding majority opinion would require the Justices in some cases to 
support decisions that they do not believe are legally sound, thereby violating 
their judicial duty.183 However, Justices have been engaging in this practice for 
close to a century without eliciting opposition.184 While unwavering adherence 
to judicial correctness is certainly an admirable principle for a Justice to follow, 
as Justice Sotomayor observed in Hughes, it is often necessary for a Justice to 
accede to a less-than-desirable viewpoint in order to “ensure clarity and stability 
in the law” when a failure to compromise would “sow[] confusion among 
litigants, and le[ave] the governing rule uncertain.”185 
Nothing in this proposed rule change should be read to suggest that any 
Justice’s voice should be altogether silenced. Although some might yearn for the 
Court to return to the days of Chief Justice Marshall, when a decision resulted 
in one, and only one, Opinion of the Court,186 that seems unlikely considering 
the current level of dissension within the Court.187 Instead, a Justice should still 
be allowed to write a concurring or dissenting opinion, but these opinions would 
be limited to merely persuasive authority. Hardly without value, these opinions 
would allow a Justice to write to future generations so that the Court may one 
day recognize the errors of the past.188 Their ability to bind other courts, 
however, will not be realized until it is proper to do so: when at least five Justices 
are willing to unequivocally stand up, sign their name to the opinion, and declare 
to the American legal community that the law has changed. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
While it began as a reasonable attempt to clarify the confusion surrounding 
non-majority decisions, Marks has run its course. Its myriad problems have 
afflicted American jurisprudence for half of a century. The Court is well aware 
of these problems and, if the Court’s willingness to correct itself in the past is 
any indication, then it will only be a matter of time before the Court announces 
what courts, lawyers, and scholars have understood for years: Marks was wrong. 
Ascertaining legal precedent from a Court opinion is a difficult and complex 
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task as it is; there is no need to further convolute it by casting doubt upon 
whether a given opinion is even precedential at all. A radical change is in order. 
The good news is that this change can be a remarkably uncomplicated endeavor 
if the Court allows it to be. By throwing out Marks and the plurality decisions 
that engendered the doctrine, the Court can reestablish itself as a truly singular 
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